
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ANNEX (B)

1. Objective

To fix moral and political responsibility for what has happened in Korea -- and all bad that will result therefrom -- upon Moscow, with specific responsibility being placed upon Moscow's Chinese and North Korean Communist collaborators.

2. Psychological Effects Desired

- a. Conviction of the wrongness of the policies and actions of Soviet-led Communism in Korea and strengthened psychological rejection of Soviet-led Communism.
- b. Strengthened desire and resolve to oppose the policies and actions of Soviet-led Communism.

3. Propaganda Points for Emphasis

- a. Insincerity, duplicity, intransigeance, and aggressive intent
 of Soviet-led Communism -- historically, in Asia in general,
 specifically in Korea -- with pointing up of falsity of "desire
 for peace" claims of Soviet-led Communism.
- b. Political responsibility of Soviet-led Communism for what has happened in Korea -- and the bad that will result therefrom.
- e. Moral responsibility of Soviet-ked Communism for what has happened in Morea -- and the bad that will result therefrom.
- d. Damaging effect of the Korean actions of Soviet-led Communism on the aspirations of the common man in the world at large and specifically in Asia.

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- e. Undesirable effects of breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations on the peace and statility of the world in general and Asia in particular.
- f. Korean events and issues which can be used to create or strengthen throughout the world:
 - (1) Disgust for the acts of Soviet-led Communism in Korea in general and at Kaesong in particular.
 - (2) Distrust of the Far Eastern motives in general and Korean motives in particular of Soviet-led Communism.
 - (3) Predispositions to reject the policies and actions of Soviet-led ommunism and Soviet-led Communism, per se (with particular emphasis directed at Asian leaders and peoples).
- g. Subservience to the Kremlin of North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders.
- h. Korean events and issues which can be used to create, in areas dominated by Soviet-led Communism, overwhelming doubt regarding the moral rightness of the actions and objectives of the Kremlin and Kremlin allies in Aorea specifically and in Asia generally.
- i. Koreon events and issues which can be used to create, or strengthen, in the minds of the Kremlin, and in the minds of its Chinese and North Kurean collaborators, the conviction that for the time being not only have they pressed their asian attack too far but also that the free world is in no mood to tolerate further aggressive action similar to that in Korea.